VES-3-18-OT-RR:BSTC:CCR H252033 WRB
Supervisory Liquidation Specialist
C/o Vessel Repair Unit
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
423 Canal Street
Suite 246
New Orleans, LA 70130
RE: 19 U.S.C. § 1466; Vessel Repair Entry C20-0040669-7; Protest 2002-13-100057; M/V THUNDER
Dear Sir:
This is in response to your memorandum of March 26, 2014, forwarding for our further review the protest filed by Foss International, Inc., (hereinafter “protestant”) with respect to Vessel Repair Entry C20-0040669-7. Our decision is set forth below.
FACTS
The M/V THUNDER (the “vessel”) is a U.S.-flag vessel. The vessel arrived at the port of Honolulu, Hawaii, on November 5, 2012, having incurred foreign shipyard costs. A vessel repair entry was filed, which your office reviewed and issued a CBP Form 29 indicating a rate advance on April 26, 2013. A protest was filed October 11, 2013, and is now before us. We note that the information in the file indicates that the protest was timely filed under the statutory and regulatory provisions for protests, having been filed within 180 days of a decision related to the entry. 19 U.S.C. § 1514(c)(3) and 19 C.F.R. § 174.12(e). The protestant claims that it is entitled to relief from vessel repair duties on the basis of a casualty occurrence.
The tug “THUNDER” is a twin-screw, ocean towing vessel that operates in service together with the barge “LIGHTNING” as an integrated tug-barge unit. The tug “THUNDER” is a United States-flagged vessel, classed by the American Bureau of Shipping, powered by two 6-cylinder diesel engines. The “THUNDER,” in tow of the barge “LIGHTNING” was on a voyage from Houston, Texas, to Beira, Mozambique, approximately 6 hours sailing time from arrival at Beira, when the starboard main engine sustained a crankcase explosion in way of the No. 5 cylinder at approximately 0355 hours, January 22, 2005. Damage was reported to extend to other components of the starboard main engine.
The vessel’s Chief Engineer described the incident, saying:
At approximately 0355, 22 January 2005 and [sic] large bang was heard throughout the ship and an explosion witness [sic] by the engine room watch, with flame and smoke emanating from the starboard main engine. The emergency team was mustered and a subsequent ship investigation revealed damage to this main engine, rendering it inoperable for the remaining leg of the voyage to Beira, Mozambique. Lost time to this voyage resulting from this casualty began at this time as the vessel sailed slowly to her destination, missing a critical tide and mooring one day late.
Emergency voyage repairs were then conducted, in port, beginning 23 January 2005 requiring the use of ships spares, ordering new spares, and adding additional spares so as to overstock quantities aboard. Work was provided by the vessel’s engineering staff and other ships crew. Labor was in the form of a technical supervisor from the engine manufacturer, flown in from South Africa. It was determined from the engine manufacturer agent that a spontaneous, unforeseeable casualty to the #5 cylinder of the starboard main engine, resulting in a crankcase explosion occurred. Damage was done to the #5 cylinder liner, piston assembly, and head.
The vessel’s Engineering Rough Logbook entries for January 23, 2005, reflect the following initial damage assessment at 0430:
Cam inspection covers bowed outwards all 6 to some degree.
All 6 explosion covers blown 2 each (12).
Boot to Mech Oiler for Cyl Heads gone.
Crankcase inspection found cyl’s 1,2,5,6 ok.
The vessel’s Master indicated in his statement of facts that on January 22, 2005, at approximately 0355, a large bang was heard throughout the ship and flame and smoke were seen emanating from the starboard main engine. Subsequent examination revealed damage to the starboard main engine which rendered it inoperable. The Master stated, “[i]t should be noted, that within six months prior to this casualty, work had been done in Amelia, LA, on 10 October 2004 to this piece of equipment where a full inspection occurred resulting in the replacement the #5 cylinder head - of which was then damaged in this casualty.”
The engine manufacturer’s representative conducted a pre-repair assessment of the starboard main engine damage. He inspected the engine and characterized the damage, saying:
1. My examination of the surrounding component involved in this casualty showed damage was the result of a spontaneous and unforeseeable failure of the #5 piston liner which was found to be cracked completely through. Surrounding components were also examined and found that this casualty was not the result of lack of maintenance, nor poor upkeep and condition of engine. Excessive wear and tear were not contributory factors to this casualty.
2. Focus of the piston damage was to #5 cylinder stbd main engine:
a: Piston showed signs of seizure in area of piston skirt
b: Cylinder liner - vertical crack on aft side extending from top collar all the way to the bottom of the liner. This crack extends completely through the wall of the liner.
c: No apparent signs of damage or faults to the cylinder head (ie no cracks or visual material damage. Nothing was broken away or found.)
d: Visual inspection of block looks okay. Clean up and dye penetrant crack testing revealed no faults.
e: Big end bearing and crankshaft journal found in excellent condition on #5 #6 and #4 cylinders.
Summary of #4 and #6 cylinder inspection
a: Dismantled #4 & #6 - pulling pistons completely out
b: Pistons and rings in good condition with no visible defects
c: No apparent signs of damage or faults to the cylinder head (ie no cracks or visual material damage. Nothing was broken away or found.)
d: Big end bearing and crankshaft journal found in excellent condition on #5 #6 and #4 cylinders.
e: #4 liner inspected: No faults found to any seizure or scuffing but MaK recommends replacing due to score markings on liner walls.
Casualty theory:
Failure and damage appears to be restricted to only #5 pistons skirt and cylinder liner. This casualty was spontaneous and unforeseeable. Though failure occurred, this damage was limited to the immediate reaction of the crew in bravely shutting down the engine at local control. (Many people would not have done this.) This immediate action resulted in minimizing what would normally have resulted in much more extensive damage to the engine.
There is evidence piston pin seizure resulting in restricted movement of the connecting rod. We are unable to inspect this item due to the fact we have not been able to disassemble or access this item.
The investigation findings of the JORE International Compliance Officer stated, in pertinent part, “The casualty to the starboard main engine was a result of a failure of the #5 cylinder piston liner splitting, with the crack going though [sic] the entire wall. The Cylinder liner was destroyed, the piston believed damage (was put on new in October 2004), the connecting rod, and entire piston assembly. Some ancillary damage occurred to #4 cylinder.”
The required damage repairs were completed in Beira, Mozambique on 5 February 2005.
ISSUE
Whether the costs for which the protestant seeks relief are dutiable, non-dutiable, or remissible under 19 U.S.C. § 1466?
LAW AND ANALYSIS
Title 19 United States Code section 1466(a) provides for the payment of duty on the cost of foreign repairs to vessels documented under the laws of the United States to engage in foreign or coastwise trade, saying, in pertinent part:
The equipments, or any part thereof, including boats, purchased for, or the repair parts or materials to be used, or the expenses of repairs made in a foreign country upon a vessel documented under the laws of the United States to engage in the foreign or coasting trade, or a vessel intended to be employed in such trade, shall, on the first arrival of such vessel in any port of the United States, be liable to entry and the payment of an ad valorem duty of 50 per centum on the cost thereof in such foreign country.
However, 19 U.S.C. § 1466(d)(1), provides:
If the owner or master of such vessel furnishes good and sufficient evidence that—
(1) such vessel, while in the regular course of her voyage, was compelled, by stress of weather or other casualty, to put into such foreign port and purchase such equipments, or make such repairs, to secure the safety and seaworthiness of the vessel to enable her to reach her port of destination; …
then the Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to remit or refund such duties, and such vessel shall not be liable to forfeiture, and no license or enrollment and license, or renewal of either, shall hereafter be issued to any such vessel until the collector to whom application is made for the same shall be satisfied, from the oath of the owner or master, that all such equipments or parts thereof or materials and repairs made within the year immediately preceding such application have been duly accounted for under the provisions of this section, and the duties accruing thereon duly paid; and if such owner or master shall refuse to take such oath, or take it falsely, the vessel shall be seized and forfeited.
The statute thus sets a three-part test which must be met in order to qualify for remission under the subsection, these being:
1. The establishment of a casualty occurrence;
2. The establishment of unsafe and unseaworthy conditions; and
3. The inability to reach the port of destination without obtaining foreign repairs.
Title 19 Code of Federal Regulations Section 4.14(h)(2)(i) entitled “Relief from duty under 19 U.S.C. 1466(d),” provides:
Requests for relief from duty under 19 U.S.C. 1466 (d) consist of claims that a foreign shipyard operation or expenditure involves any of the following: (i) Stress of weather or other casualty. Relief will be granted if good and sufficient evidence supports a finding that the vessel, while in the regular course of its voyage, was forced by stress of weather or other casualty, while outside the United States, to purchase such equipment or make those repairs as are necessary to secure the safety and seaworthiness of the vessel in order to enable it to reach its port of destination in the United States. For the purposes of this paragraph, a ‘casualty’ does not include any purchase or repair made necessary by ordinary wear and tear, but does include the failure of a part to function if it is proven that the specific part was repaired, serviced, or replaced in the United States immediately before the start of the voyage in question, and then failed within six months of that date.
It is Customs position that “port of destination” means a port in the United States.
Protestant asserts that the facts as discussed above constitute a marine casualty as a basis for relief from vessel repair duties pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1466(d)(1) and 19 C.F.R. § 4.14(h)(2)(i). Jurisprudence has provided significant guidance regarding the phrase “or other casualty.” In Dollar S.S. Lines v. United States, the United States Customs Court stated, “We are clearly of the opinion that the court below was correct in its holding that ‘other casualty,’ as used in said section, meant an accidental destruction by some cause of like character and operation as fire such as lightning, floods, cyclones, storms, or other.” The Dollar Court further reasoned:
In the case at bar the word “casualty” is to be considered together with the phrase “stress of weather.” The phrase “or other casualty” is supplemental to and qualifies the phrase “stress of weather” broadening the term to include other similar casualties. In order to determine the particular class of casualty under which exemption from duty may be granted by the Secretary of the Treasury, we must consider the meaning of the term “stress of weather.” The word “stress” is defined in Funk and Wagnalls New Standard Dictionary, page 2396, as follows:
2. Force exerted to or beyond the point of strain; tension; as, to subject a faculty to the utmost stress. 3. Influence exerted forcibly; pressure; violence; compulsion; as stress of weather.
We have, therefore, under the term “stress of weather” the forcible influence or violence of the weather exerted upon vessels unexpectedly in such a manner that the safety and seaworthiness thereof is so endangered that the purchase of equipment or the making of repairs becomes necessary in order to enable such vessel to reach her port of destination. A casualty similar to “stress of weather” would include such as is violently exerted; that which comes with unexpected force or violence, such as that of a fire, or a collision, or an explosion.
We are of the opinion that a casualty similar to “stress of weather” should be of necessity a happening that comes with the violence of the turbulent forces of nature.
In International Navigation Co. v. United States, the Customs Court, citing Dollar, examined the legislative history of section 466, Tariff Act of 1922, the predecessor of 19 U.S.C. § 1466. Noting that Congress had chosen not to include language to allow remission of duties to repair damages suffered or to replace equipment damaged or worn out during a voyage, the Court stated, “It is evident that under the provision as enacted it was not intended that duties should be remitted in all cases where repairs were made because of damages suffered or equipment damaged or worn out during the course of a voyage, even though such repairs were necessary to maintain the vessel in a seaworthy condition. It was only where the damage occurred by reason of some serious or extraor-dinary [sic] event, described as ‘stress of weather or other casualty,’ that remission was permitted.”
The Customs Court further expounded on the Congressional intent underlying § 1466 in Suwannee Steamship Company v. United States. In that case, the Court further expanded upon the Congressional choice of language in § 1466, noting that the decision not to include the language, “…or to repair damages suffered or to replace equipment damaged or worn out during the voyage,” reflected a desire to protect American shipyards. The Suwannee Steamship Court contrasted the intent of the rejected House amendment with that of the final language adopted by the Senate, saying:
The rationale for this revision of section 466 was stated succinctly in the Report of the House Committee on Ways and Means:
“Your committee believes that the limitations of this section [section 466 of the Tariff Act of 1922] are too strict and result in an unnecessary burden on American shipping.
The section as construed does not permit the remission for refunding of duties in the case of equipment purchased or repairs made in the ordinary course of the voyage to replace worn-out equipment or to repair minor damages or ordinary wear and tear.” H. Rep. No. 7, 71st Cong., 1st Sess. 171 (1929).
Clearly, the House amendment would have greatly increased the situations in which duties were to be remitted. Under the amendment, only a general overhaul or reconditioning would have been excluded from the remission allowance. See id.
The members of the Senate Finance Committee rejected this House amendment, and, in the bill reported to the full Senate, substituted the wording that presently appears in section 466.
Both the hearings of the Senate Committee, and the committee's final report on section 466, evidence the concern of the committee members that the House amendment would have provided insufficient protection for American shipyards, the class for whose benefit the section was originally formulated. See Senate Hearings on H.R. 2667, 71st Cong., 1st Sess., Vol. XVII at 537-46 (1929) [hereinafter cited as Hearings]; S. Rep. No. 37, 71st Cong., 1st Sess. 72 (1929).
In furthering this goal of protecting American shipyards, the Senate version of section 466 did two things. First, it limited remission to relatively serious repairs: those necessary “to secure the safety and seaworthiness of the vessel to enable her to reach her port of destination.” And second, it strictly defined both the nature and the timing of the cause of the damage necessitating the repairs. This was accomplished by authorizing remission only for those repairs caused "by stress of weather or other casualty," provided that the stress of weather or other casualty occurred while the vessel was “in the regular course of her voyage.”
In its implementation of 19 U.S.C. § 1466, CBP has consistently applied the holdings in Dollar, International Navigation, and Suwannee Steamship. See HQ 106159 (Sep. 8, 1983); HQ 115911 (May 9, 2003); HQ W116688 (Feb. 9, 2007); and, HQ 112144 (Jun. 10, 1992).
The facts at hand do not meet the three-part test previously discussed in that they do not establish a casualty occurrence, the very first requirement of the test. The facts clearly establish that this incident was caused by the failure of the starboard main engine #5 piston cylinder liner. The evidence as supplied by the protestant clearly indicates that the cylinder liner fractured. While the engine manufacturer’s representative stated, “…examination of the surrounding component involved in this casualty showed damage was the result of a spontaneous and unforeseeable failure of the #5 piston liner which was found to be cracked completely through. Surrounding components were also examined and found that this casualty was not the result of lack of maintenance, nor poor upkeep and condition of engine. Excessive wear and tear were not contributory factors to this casualty,” the protestant has adduced no evidence that the cylinder liner was acted upon by some identifiable event or unexpected outside force or violence so as to be immediately obvious to ship’s personnel, as required to establish a casualty occurrence. In short, there was no identifiable occurrence to the cylinder liner that caused it to fail, necessitating that we consider the failure to have been caused by normal wear and tear. In HQ 106159 (Sep. 8, 1983), the relationship of an unseaworthy condition to the casualty for the purposes of 19 U.S.C. § 1466 was laid out, saying:
The petitioner is apparently equating a finding of unseaworthiness with a casualty occurrence. The two are not necessarily related. A finding that a vessel is unseaworthy provides no evidence of exactly how it came to be in such a state. In fact, absent specific evidence to the contrary, we consider foreign repairs to have been necessitated by normal wear and tear, a result which does not permit remission.
In HQ 115911 (May 9, 2003), a matter factually similar to the matter at hand, CBP’s predecessor agency, the U.S. Customs Service, denied a claim for remission pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1466(d)(1) where a vessel’s main engine piston cracked and failed leading to a leak of oil into the scavenger air receiver, causing an explosion. In that matter, it was determined that the main causal element of the explosion was the failure of the number six piston. The number six piston failed, leaking oil into the scavenger air receiver, which in turn caused an explosion. As a result, the main engines were shut down, and the vessel needed to be towed for repairs. We remarked, citing Dollar, “The term ‘casualty’ as it is used in the statute, has been interpreted as something which, like stress of weather, comes with unexpected force or violence, such as fire, spontaneous explosion of such dimensions as to be immediately obvious to ship’s personnel, or collision. In this sense, a ‘casualty’ arises from an identifiable event of some sort. In the absence of evidence of such casualty event, we must consider the repair to have been necessitated by normal wear and tear.” (citations omitted).
Similarly, in HQ W116688 (Feb. 9, 2007), we examined a case where the turbocharger on a vessel’s main engine exploded and the vessel sustained fire damage as a consequence of the blow-up of the exhaust gas into the turbocharger casing. As a result of the explosion the vessel was left drifting and required a tow. Like the matter at hand, in HQ W116688 the owners alleged that the damage to the vessel resulted from the explosion and resulting fire in the turbocharger. However, we remarked, “The claim that the ship was subject to an explosion and fire is not in dispute. However, the cause of that damage is the determinative fact for this ‘casualty’ claim.” It was determined that the underlying cause of the explosion and resulting fire was most likely the failure of the cylinder fuel injector. In determining that the statute provided no authority for CBP to grant relief for a defective or prematurely failing part (citing C.S.D. 79-32), we ruled that these causes did not come within a defined casualty, and remission under 19 U.S.C. 1466(d)(1) was denied. In C.S.D. 79-32, it was held that a breakdown or failure of machinery may not be regarded as a casualty in the absence of a showing that it was caused by some outside force.
Also, in HQ 112144 (Jun. 10, 1992), the vessel experienced an “explosion” of the crank case of the starboard main engine. The engineer found the No. 1 right bank crankcase explosion door blown out and lubricating oil coming out of the engine with part of the piston lying on the deck beside the explosion door. The petitioner argued that a crankcase explosion damaged the engine, equating the occurrence of a fire, explosion, etc. to a casualty. However it was determined that the underlying cause of the explosion could be reasonably approximated to engine damage which occurred previously, and that that the explosion occurred as a result of the engine being in poor condition. Accordingly, the repairs were held to be dutiable.
The protestant argues that HQ H186595 provides additional bases for remission, holding the subject vessel’s damages were the result of a marine casualty and subject to remission. The ruling cited the Code of Federal Regulations definition of a “marine casualty” as provided in 46 C.F.R. § 4.03-1, and that the vessel suffered a “marine casualty” as contemplated in 46 C.F.R. § 4.03-1, because the damage suffered by the THUNDER resulted from an explosion. The facts in HQ H186595 are distinguishable from present matter. In HQ H186595, the vessel suffered damage to its steering gear from an unknown underwater source. Upon examination, the rudderstock was found to be bent in the lower taper area. In the present matter, the damage was to the vessel’s main engine resulting from a failed cylinder liner, damage whose causation is susceptible of determination. We stated in the earlier ruling, citing C.I.E. 1202/59, “…damage to the underwater parts of vessels is normally not readily detectable or susceptible of definite proof respecting the date and place of occurrence. Therefore, relief under § 1466(d)(1) may be granted in the absence of proof that the vessel concerned was grounded, struck bottom or her propeller contacted some floating object capable of causing damage.”
Protestant also mischaracterizes the use of U.S. Coast Guard regulations such as 46 C.F.R. § 4.03-1 in the vessel casualty reporting process. The underlying issue involving the use of Coast Guard casualty reporting regulations is adequacy of documentation of establishment of a casualty occurrence. Reference to Coast Guard vessel casualty reporting regulations in HQ 112925 and HQ 115811 demonstrates that our use of Coast Guard provisions is solely in reference to the question of whether the record presented adequately established a casualty occurrence. In HQ 112925, reference was made to the Coast Guard casualty reporting regulations to help answer the question of whether sufficient proof had been submitted to establish that the subject repairs were necessitated by a “casualty” which was remissible under the vessel repair statute, 19 U.S.C. § 1466. In that matter, one of the central questions was whether the casualty occurrence was timely reported to the Coast Guard, and the adequacy of verbal reporting and documentation, including the Coast Guard “Permit to Proceed to Another Port for Repairs,” to establish the casualty event. The Coast Guard casualty reporting regulations and their definitions were not applied to the 19 U.S.C. § 1466 analysis.
Similarly, in HQ 115188, the question to be resolved with reference to USCG vessel casualty reporting regulations was whether the evidence presented was sufficient to prove that the foreign costs for which the petitioner sought relief were necessitated by a casualty occurrence thus warranting remission pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1466. As the Coast Guard is the agency charged with determining questions of a vessel’s fitness to proceed from a foreign port once damage has been noted, reference was made in HQ 115188 to that agency’s regulations for the purposes of determining the adequacy of documentation. It is noteworthy that in HQ 115188, reference is made to the Customs definition of “casualty” for 19 U.S.C. § 1466 and no reference is made to the USCG regulatory definition of a casualty having any impact on the 19 U.S.C. § 1466 analysis.
The same can be said of HQ H186595. As in HQ 112925 and HQ 115188, supra, the issue presented was whether the documentary evidence submitted was sufficient to find that the foreign costs for which the petitioner sought relief were necessitated by a casualty occurrence thus warranting remission pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1466(d)(1). We also note that the language used in H186595 closely tracks that of HQ 112925 and HQ 115188. Just as in HQ 115188, because the Coast Guard is the agency charged with determining whether a vessel is fit to proceed from a foreign port once damage has been noted, reference was made to that agency’s regulations for the purposes of determining the adequacy of documentation, particularly with reference to marine surveys carried out by a contractor. The continuity of this ruling with our prior determinations is demonstrated by the clear reference and citation to prior like rulings on the same topic, as well as the continuing position taken by this agency that the submission of a CG-2692 (Report of Marine Accident, Injury or Death), without accompanying documentation from the appropriate USCG OCMI authorizing the vessel to proceed in a damaged condition and specifying what, if any, restrictions apply, will not suffice for granting remission pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1466. HQ H186595 must be read in pari materia with the other vessel casualty reporting cases above and is consistent with them. As in the cases cited above, at no place did HQ H186595 adopt the USCG regulatory reporting definition of “casualty” as the Customs definition of a “casualty” for 19 U.S.C. § 1466 purposes. Accordingly, Protestant’s reliance on H186595 is misplaced.
Petitioner also asserts that the vessel’s starboard main engine had been serviced three months prior to the explosion. In support of this assertion, petitioner submits the Report of Survey, which states, “The last major overhaul of the starboard main engine was reportedly carried out during February 2001 at Amelia, Louisiana by MaK. Americas, Inc. with additional repairs effected during October 2004.” (emphasis added). The only other evidence of this alleged engine repair is the assertion in the Master’s statement, “[i]t should be noted, that within six months prior to this casualty, work had been done in Amelia, La. on 10 October 2004 to this piece of equipment where a full inspection occurred resulting in the replacement [sic] the #5 cylinder head – of which was then damaged in this casualty.”
Petitioner has been unable to produce any independent documentation, such as bills, receipts, or invoices, supporting this claim. Only a self-serving statement has been adduced. The Master’s statement is an internally generated document and can be considered to be self-serving in that the Master was an employee of the vessel’s owners at the time the statement was made. CBP has traditionally held that internally generated documents, without more evidence, do not constitute sufficient proof in support of the position asserted. See HQ H110717 (June 28, 1990), HQ H111942 (March 15, 1995), and HQ H057909 (March 2, 2010). Similarly, the Report of Survey fails to provide any independent documentation of the alleged repair to the vessel’s engine, in that its purpose was limited to a review of documents relating to the vessel. As such, it constitutes only a recapitulation of the documents already in the record and provides no independent support of the engine repair claim. Pursuant to 19 C.F.R. § 4.14 (i)(1)(i), a specific listing of the kinds of documentary evidence which must be filed to support applications for relief from vessel repair duties. Listed first among these are “...itemized bills, receipts, and invoices.” Considering that there is no third-party corroborating evidence, the documentation provided is insufficient to support non-dutiability.
After careful consideration, we are of the opinion that the correct application of 19 U.S.C. § 1466 to the facts of this case, as laid out in Dollar, International Navigation, and Suwannee Steamship, holding that duties should not be remitted in all cases where repairs were made because of damages suffered or equipment damaged or worn out during the course of a voyage, even though such repairs were necessary to maintain the vessel in a seaworthy condition, requires us to hold that the repairs occasioned by the failure of the M/V THUNDER’s starboard main engine #5 cylinder liner to have been necessitated by normal wear and tear. Accordingly, they are dutiable.
HOLDING
The costs for which the protestant seeks relief are dutiable under 19 U.S.C. § 1466 as discussed in the Law and Analysis section of this ruling. You are instructed to deny the protest with respect to the costs discussed in this ruling.
In accordance with the Protest/Petition Processing Handbook (CIS HB, January 2007), you are to mail this decision, together with the Customs Form 19, to the protestant no later than 60 days from the date of this letter. Any final duty determination of the entry in accordance with the decision must be accomplished prior to mailing of the decision. Sixty days from the date of the decision the Office of Regulations and Rulings will make the decision available to CBP personnel, and to the
public on the CBP Home Page on the World Wide Web at www.cbp.gov by means of the Freedom of Information Act, and other methods of public distribution.
Sincerely,
Lisa L. Burley
Chief/Supervisory Attorney-Advisor
Cargo Security, Carriers and Restricted Merchandise Branch
Office of International Trade, Regulations and Rulings
U.S. Customs and Border Protection