(a) The terms “administrative practice or enforcement policy” refer to courses of conduct or policies which an agency has determined to follow 111 in the administration and enforcement of a statute, either generally, or with respect to specific classes of situations. 112 Administrative practices and enforcement policies may be set forth in statements addressed by the agency to the public. 113 Although they may be, and frequently are, based upon decisions or views which the agency has set forth in its regulations, orders, rulings, approvals, or interpretations, nevertheless administrative practices and enforcement policies differ from these forms of agency action in that such practices or policies are not limited to matters concerned with the meaning or legal effect of the statutes administered by the agency and may be based wholly or in part on other considerations.

(b) To illustrate this distinction, suppose the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division issues a general statement indicating that in his opinion a certain class of employees come within a specified exemption from provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act in any workweek when they do not engage in a substantial amount of nonexempt work. Such a statement is an “interpretation” within the meaning of sections 9 and 10 of the Portal Act. Assume that at the same time, the Administrator states that for purposes of enforcement, until further notice such an employee will be considered as engaged in a substantial amount of nonexempt work in any workweek when he spends in excess of a specified percentage of his time in such nonexempt work. This latter type of statement announces an “administrative practice or enforcement policy” within the meaning of sections 9 and 10 of the Portal Act.

(c) An administrative practice or enforcement policy may, under certain circumstances be at variance with the agency's current interpretation of the law. For example, suppose the Administrator announces that as a result of court decisions he has changed his view as to coverage of a certain class of employees under the Fair Labor Standards Act. However, he may at the same time announce that in order to give affected employers an opportunity to make the adjustments necessary for compliance with the changed interpretation, the Wage and Hour Division will not commence to enforce the Act on the basis of the new interpretation until the expiration of a specified period.

(d) In the statement of the managers on the part of the House, accompanying the report of the Conference Committee on the Portal-to-Portal Act, it is indicated (page 16) that under sections 9 and 10 “an employer will be relieved from liability, in an action by an employee, because of reliance in good faith on an administrative practice or enforcement policy only (1) where such practice or policy was based on the ground that an act or omission was not a violation of the (Fair Labor Standards) Act, or (2) where a practice or policy of not enforcing the Act with respect to acts or omissions led the employer to believe in good faith that such acts or omissions were not violations of the Act.”

(e) The statement explaining the Conference Committee Report goes on to say, “However, the employer will be relieved from criminal proceedings or injunctions brought by the United States, not only in the cases described in the preceding paragraph, but also where the practice or policy was such as to lead him in good faith to believe that he would not be proceeded against by the United States.”

(f) The statement explaining the Conference Committee Report gives the following illustrations of the above rules:

(g) It is to be noted that, under the language of sections 9 and 10, an employer has a defense for good faith reliance on an administrative practice or an enforcement policy only when such practice or policy is “with respect to the class of employers to which he belonged.” 114 Thus where an enforcement policy has been announced pertaining to laundries and linen-supply companies serving industrial or commercial establishments the operator of an establishment furnishing window-washing service to industrial and commercial concerns, who relied upon that policy in regard to his employees, has no defense under sections 9 and 10. The enforcement policy upon which he claimed reliance did not pertain to “the class of employers to which he belonged.”

(h) Administrative practices and enforcement policies, similar to administrative regulations, orders, rulings, approvals and interpretations required affirmative action by an administrative agency. 115 This should not be construed as meaning that an agency may not have administrative practices or policies to refrain from taking certain action as well as practices or policies contemplating positive acts of some kind. 116 But before it can be determined that an agency actually has a practice or policy to refrain from acting, there must be evidence of its adoption by the agency through some affirmative action establishing it as the practice or policy of the agency. 117 Suppose, for example, that shoe factories in a particular area were not investigated by Wage and Hour Division inspectors operating in the area. This fact would not establish the existence of a practice or policy of the Administrator to treat the employees of such establishments, for enforcement purposes, as not subject to the provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act, in the absence of proof of some affirmative action by the Administrator adopting such a practice or policy. A failure to inspect might be due to any one of a number of different reasons. It might, for instance, be due entirely to the fact that the inspectors' time was fully occupied in inspections of other industries in the area.

(i) It was pointed out above that sections 9 and 10 do not offer a defense to the employer who relies upon a regulation, order, ruling, approval or interpretation which at the time of his reliance has been rescinded, modified or determined by judicial authority to be invalid. The same is true regarding administrative practices and enforcement policies. 118 However, a plea of a “good faith” defense is not defeated by the fact that after the employer's reliance, the practice or policy is rescinded, modified, or declared invalid.