References in Text
Section 1036 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, referred to in subsec. (a)(10), is [section 1036 of Pub. L. 111–84], Oct. 28, 2009, [123 Stat. 2190], which is not classified to the Code. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see Tables.
Amendments
2018—[Pub. L. 115–387, § 2(a)(6)(A)], substituted “Responsibilities” for “Mission of Office” in section catchline.
Subsec. (a)(11). [Pub. L. 115–387, § 2(a)(6)(B)], substituted “Office” for “Domestic Nuclear Detection Office” in introductory provisions.
2010—Subsec. (a)(10) to (14). [Pub. L. 111–140, § 4(a)(1)], added pars. (10) to (13) and redesignated former par. (10) as (14).
Subsec. (b). [Pub. L. 111–140, § 4(a)(2)], added subsec. (b).
Findings
[Pub. L. 111–140, § 2], Feb. 16, 2010, [124 Stat. 31], provided that: “Congress finds the following:“(1)
The threat of a nuclear terrorist attack on American interests, both domestic and abroad, is one of the most serious threats to the national security of the United States. In the wake of an attack, attribution of responsibility would be of utmost importance. Because of the destructive power of a nuclear weapon, there could be little forensic evidence except the radioactive material in the weapon itself.
“(2)
Through advanced nuclear forensics, using both existing techniques and those under development, it may be possible to identify the source and pathway of a weapon or material after it is interdicted or detonated. Though identifying intercepted smuggled material is now possible in some cases, pre-detonation forensics is a relatively undeveloped field. The post-detonation nuclear forensics field is also immature, and the challenges are compounded by the pressures and time constraints of performing forensics after a nuclear or radiological attack.
“(3)
A robust and well-known capability to identify the source of nuclear or radiological material intended for or used in an act of terror could also deter prospective proliferators. Furthermore, the threat of effective attribution could compel improved security at material storage facilities, preventing the unwitting transfer of nuclear or radiological materials.
“(4)
(A)
In order to identify special nuclear material and other radioactive materials confidently, it is necessary to have a robust capability to acquire samples in a timely manner, analyze and characterize samples, and compare samples against known signatures of nuclear and radiological material.
“(B)
Many of the radioisotopes produced in the detonation of a nuclear device have short half-lives, so the timely acquisition of samples is of the utmost importance. Over the past several decades, the ability of the United States to gather atmospheric samples—often the preferred method of sample acquisition—has diminished. This ability must be restored and modern techniques that could complement or replace existing techniques should be pursued.
“(C)
The discipline of pre-detonation forensics is a relatively undeveloped field. The radiation associated with a nuclear or radiological device may affect traditional forensics techniques in unknown ways. In a post-detonation scenario, radiochemistry may provide the most useful tools for analysis and characterization of samples. The number of radiochemistry programs and radiochemists in United States National Laboratories and universities has dramatically declined over the past several decades. The narrowing pipeline of qualified people into this critical field is a serious impediment to maintaining a robust and credible nuclear forensics program.
“(5)
Once samples have been acquired and characterized, it is necessary to compare the results against samples of known material from reactors, weapons, and enrichment facilities, and from medical, academic, commercial, and other facilities containing such materials, throughout the world. Some of these samples are available to the International Atomic Energy Agency through safeguards agreements, and some countries maintain internal sample databases. Access to samples in many countries is limited by national security concerns.
“(6)
In order to create a sufficient deterrent, it is necessary to have the capability to positively identify the source of nuclear or radiological material, and potential traffickers in nuclear or radiological material must be aware of that capability. International cooperation may be essential to catalogue all existing sources of nuclear or radiological material.”